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Professor Mihail Lotman has been quoted as saying: ‘For my father there were two types 
of scholar – the one who has the questions and the one who has the answers. He belonged 
to the first.’1 I aspire to emulate the great Yuri Lotman at least in this respect – I plan to 
raise more questions than I can answer. 
The ‘creative industries’ idea does not belong to anyone, and its orphan status in the 
disciplinary family has been one of its continuing problems. No existing science 
developed a theory that could then be tested, using formal hypotheses, experiments, 
fieldwork, data-analysis and the like.  
Instead, government departments sought to benefit from the ‘new’ or ‘weightless’ 
information or knowledge-based economy,2 from existing competitive advantage in 
certain industry sectors, especially in the UK which boasted a large creative economy in 
the capital, and from seeking to redefine culture as an earning sector (growth) rather than 
spending one (heritage, welfare). All of this came together during the first New Labour 
government in the UK, when in 1998 culture minister Chris Smith sought to boost his 
portfolio’s clout by yoking these ‘heterogeneous ideas by violence together’ (as if he were 
one of Dr Johnson’s metaphysical poets), in order to get more support from the Treasury 
for culture.  
The idea worked. You don’t have to agree that it was a stroke of genius to admit that it 
was timely, productive and had far-reaching consequences, many unforeseen. Although 
the Treasury remained as flinty-hearted as ever, the ‘creative industries’ genie was 
unleashed from the knowledge-domain bottle, and Smith’s department of Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS) gained first-mover advantage in defining the creative industries. 
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The important policy move here was to get culture away from the back door of the 
economy where it traditionally sat, tin cup in hand, crankily biting the hand that fed it, 
right around to the front and centre of innovation strategy, where suddenly it was 
revealed as a high-growth sector, outperforming other services (never mind sluggish 
manufacturing). It was dynamic and emergent, with multiplier effects on other sectors, a 
high rate of entrepreneurial initiative, and lots of start-ups, micro-businesses and sole-
traders, some of them – ageing rock stars – worth more than many large-scale companies.  
Flaws 
One question did not even make it on to the agenda of a department whose main jobs 
were to spruik business and keep the arts lobby docile, and that was this: Is it possible to 
have a ‘creative economy’ based on the creativity of the whole population, not just on 
existing artistic elites, professional designers and an ‘expert pipeline’ model of copyright-
protected creativity?  
There were other flaws in this policy initiative. First was the insistence that the creative 
industries, based as they are on individual talent, could only prosper in a world where 
intellectual property was strongly enforced. This left out of account the burgeoning world 
of consumer-created content and user-led innovation; and it forgot that creativity 
involves a lot of copying from past masters and contemporary competitors.  
Second, it anchored the idea of the creative industries in the analogue era, where 
individual artists produced individual works either for public institutions or in a 
traditional marketplace dominated by single-platform firms (broadcasters, record-labels, 
film studios, publishers, newspapers, fashion designers etc.). It missed out not only on the 
affordances of digital technologies, but more importantly on the internet ethos of 
‘knowledge shared is knowledge gained,’ and on the non-market or ‘gift economy’ aspect 
of social networking, crowd-sourcing and communities of affect.  
Third, City of London hubris. After all, didn’t the Brits have a world-beater in the shape 
of the City’s financial services industry? And wasn’t London a great creative capital in 
showbiz, publishing, media, broadcasting and cultural tourism as well? So what could be 
more appropriate than to model an ambition for the creative industries on the success of 
financial services, Britain’s biggest export. This was before September 2008, when the 
head office of Lehman Bros in the US phoned to say, ‘London, you’re on your own.’3 
A fourth weakness was its nationalistic bias. Everyone from the then UK finance minister 
Gordon Brown downwards believed that here was an example of ‘competitive advantage’ 
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for the UK as opposed to other countries. All the talk was of how to lead the world, not 
join it. No-one paused to wonder how countries might collaborate rather than compete in 
a globally networked system whose real motive force was located offshore. 
Chris Smith’s successor at the DCMS, Tessa Jowell, made speeches about how the UK 
could leave low-cost manufacturing to the Chinese and concentrate on high value-add 
creative goods and services. She forgot to mention that the Chinese themselves might 
have other ideas about that, and were listening carefully to foreign advisers (we were 
among them) who were telling them that they needed to shift from a low-cost ‘made in 
China’ economy to high-value ‘created in China,’4 by growing their own creative sector, 
encouraging domestic consumption, and aspiring to turn around the ‘creative trade 
deficit’ where they imported more ideas from the West than they exported Chinese 
culture, media, branding, and knowledge.  
Technology 
So while the creative industries initiative of the DCMS in the late 1990s was inspired, it 
was also self-serving and irrationally exuberant. The bubble obligingly burst in March 
2000 with the dot-com crash, bringing the NASDAQ back from 5000 points to 1300, 
where it languished for years.  
Although a good many ICT ventures lost their money, the digital media and the internet 
did not go away, any more than railroads or automobiles had after previous stock-market 
crashes in the 1850s and 1930s. Nor did the creative industries suffer as much as  other 
sectors with exposure to ICTs. However, it was a chastening experience to see how 
‘precarious’ creative enterprise could be, among both (venture) capitalists and (artistic) 
workers, once culture had been redefined in market terms rather than in those of heritage 
or subsidy. 5 
By this time, in fact, it had become clear that high-tech ICTs – fat pipes – were going to 
be crucial to the creative sector, not the death of it. European-style ‘analogue’ creative 
industries and cultural institutions did not amount to much without US-style digital 
technologies and market-based new-media platforms.  
Here the European tradition of public culture and cultural institutions met the American 
tradition of individualism and the entrepreneurial ethos. Where ‘Britart’ artists might 
aspire to place their work in a museum (preferably the Tate Modern, Cool Britannia’s 
latest tourist attraction), Californian computer geeks aspired to turn their string of code 
into a global corporation.  
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Was it possible to integrate these aspirations – intermingling artistry and 
entrepreneurship, individual talent and global scale, public culture and consumer 
demand, creativity and computing power? 
In short, might digital technologies enable us to take creativity to population-wide 
participation and global scale?  Did ‘global media’ have to imply ‘monopoly control’ by 
the usual suspects – Hollywood and international media moguls like Rupert Murdoch? Or 
could anyone get a look-in? If so, might smaller or emergent economies (say, Australia, or 
China) benefit from technological advances and join in too? 
Although ‘big media’ remained prominent as they migrated to the net, it was obvious 
from the start that online creativity could now also include a bottom-up, peer to peer 
element, since that’s how the whole thing was invented in the first place. There was no 
reason in principle why such inventiveness had to be located in California. 
Geography 
Even so, California was a formidable competitor. Silicon Valley provided the model of a 
geographical creative cluster, where concentrating garage start-ups together seemed to 
make it easier for some of them to burgeon into global corporations in just a few years.  
Richard Florida popped up to argue that the ‘creative class’ of knowledge professionals 
and ideas entrepreneurs was numerically small (only 150m people worldwide), but it was 
disproportionately responsible for economic growth and creative innovation (which were 
increasingly the same thing). Its members included a lot more occupations than the 
traditional idea of creatives. There were the computer and mathematical geeks; 
architecture and engineering; life, physical and social-science occupations; education, 
training and library occupations; the arts, design, entertainment, sports and media. These 
‘no collar’ professionals, who also liked to live in an ‘experience economy,’ were mobile 
and went where they liked, so you’d better make your city creative-friendly if you 
wanted to attract them.  
Florida’s message struck a nerve with city planners worldwide, resulting in the surreal 
scene of mayors and bureaucrats puzzling over their ‘creative class indexes’ to see if they 
had enough students and gay people to make a viable creative city.  
But could anywhere be a creative city? Even Florida didn’t think so. Eventually he settled 
on 40-odd ‘mega-regions’ as the crucibles of global creativity: ‘The places that thrive 
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today are those with the highest velocity of ideas, the highest density of talented and 
creative people, the highest rate of “urban metabolism”’ (The Atlantic, March 2009).  
Most of them remain in the USA, according to Florida, but worldwide you can also find 
them in Europe (Greater London; ‘Am-Brus-Twerp’) and Asia (Greater Tokyo, China’s 
Shanghai-Beijing corridor, and India’s Bangalore-Mumbai area).   
Growth 
Although Florida focused on cities, the convergence of telecommunications, computer 
and media technologies meant that it was also possible to imagine content-creation as a 
globally distributed user-created system.6 Everyone (with access to the web) could 
produce and publish their own media content, or share favourite stuff with their peers. 
Creative content converged with telecommunications.  
Instead of trying to make money out of unique items (this film; that painting), you could 
make it by promoting creative traffic among peers who made the creative content for 
themselves. In other words, once the World Wide Web could handle video (by 2005), it 
was possible to imagine how something like Bit-torrent or YouTube might replace 
broadcasting as the ‘platform’ for creative media.  
‘Platform’ is the wrong metaphor here, implying something stable upon which to build 
the castle where – as they said at the time – ‘content is king.’ The speed of change on the 
technical side continued to obey Moore’s Law – growth was faster than exponential, 
doubling the extent of creative infrastructure, speed, connectivity, users, uses and content 
every couple of years. And of course much of the resultant content was shared, pirated, 
unpaid or amateur, making it very hard to erect a viable business plan over any new 
platform. 
This produced further uncertainty and dynamism in creative enterprise. This year’s hot 
new platform or ‘killer app’ was next year’s landfill – thereby giving rise to a not 
altogether welcome new ‘creative industry,’ that of processing e-waste, in which the 
Chinese town of Guiyu in Guandong is a world-leader.7 Intel’s business plan assumed that 
the most successful product of the forthcoming financial year would be something that 
had not yet been invented. They maintained a research budget the same size as Australia’s 
to make sure the invention was theirs.  
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Continuing growth was driven by technological innovation, by the extension of digital 
participation across an ever-wider population, and by the burgeoning uses to which all 
this capability could be put, both within businesses and in informal social networks. 
One very interesting aspect of this growth was how it outpaced public policy settings. 
Although (as ever) crucial technological breakthroughs were part-funded by the defence 
industry, most of the energy came from non-government agencies, some set up for profit 
and many not.  
When public policy did catch up – in the shape of the 1998 DCMS initiative – it focused 
exclusively on economic growth, as a sort of updated industry policy. It was not focused 
on the wider and more important question of the growth of knowledge.8  
Thus, relatively little public investment was made in the propagation of digital take-up 
across populations, in education for digital literacy, or in support for creative 
development and organisation (other than business services for creative firms).  
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, modernising countries had invested vast 
public resources in achieving universal print-literacy, but no such effort was 
contemplated in relation to digital media. As far as the growth of knowledge via 
computers, telecommunications, and media networks went, ‘the people’ were on their 
own.   
Social networks 
In short, the growth of knowledge was a problem not for the government but for the 
market – and that was government policy. If people wanted a creative economy 
benefiting from global digital technologies, and if individuals wanted to hook-up with 
like-minded others worldwide, then they must ‘do it themselves.’ 
The dotcom crash and the digital revolution emboldened some to say that the problem 
had been caused not by too much creativity but too little. Attention had been focussed 
too narrowly on connectivity and the use of IT for internal business operations. What 
might the population at large like to do with this network?  
Enter DIY culture, Web 2.0 and the new global players, Google, Facebook, YouTube, 
Wikipedia, Flickr.  
Here the true nature of the creative economy crystallised in a way that had not been clear 
till now. The creative industries were not the ‘copyright’ industry; they were not the ‘arts’ 
7 
 
industry; they were not creative ‘professions’ (designers, media producers etc.); they were 
not the ‘media industries.’ The creative industries were characterised by something rather 
different: they were – and are – social network markets. 9 
Social network markets have two main peculiarities. The first is that people’s choices are 
determined by the choices of others in the network. The second is that choices are status-
based. Why are these characteristics peculiar?  
(i) Markets are supposed to be based on self-interested choice, which is assumed to be 
individualist and rationalist, not determined by the choices of others. In social 
network markets choice is externalist or system-based, produced by relationships 
not reason – reason is the outcome of collective choices in a system of relations, 
not an input.  
 
(ii) Choice is meant to satisfy wants or needs. But in social network markets it 
expresses status-relations. Thus, the creative industries don’t look very much like a 
neoclassical market. The choices of high-status celebrities will often be preferred, 
and those of low-status people avoided, creating a market in celebrity 
endorsement. Celebrity itself is not a product of but an input into such a market. 
Emma Watson can make Burberry cool again; but she had to be Emma Watson 
first.  
‘Entrepreneurial consumers’ too can gain status by making admired choices, not 
just in high fashion but also in street fashion, like Harajuku in Japan.10 And 
because status is both relative and transient, the continuing process of making 
choices in social networks has an impact on status and thus on values (and further 
choices), both cultural and economic.  
This is what Jason Potts calls ‘choice under novelty’ as opposed to choice under 
uncertainty or choice under risk, both of which have been studied in behavioural 
economics.11 When faced with new knowledge, new connections, or new ideas, people 
cannot reduce uncertainty by getting more information, precisely because what they’re 
facing is new. Thus, suggests Potts, ‘rational economic agents’ – that’s everyone – observe 
and learn from how others are making choices, and thus how to respond to the new. This 
is how they get into social network markets in the first place. Once there, observing and 
connecting with others, not least by random copying,12 new possibilities open up, 
including other opportunities for ‘consumer productivity’ and co-creation. 
8 
 
Further, much of what constitutes social networks, and therefore the creative industries,  
is not market-based at all, at least not in the usual sense. This is because social networks 
exist prior to and outside of markets (among families, friends, neighbours, enemies etc.); 
and because they belong to the ‘economy of attention’ as much as to the monetary 
economy.13  
People place value on the attention they give and receive. This is an economy of signals as 
much as one of monetary values, which is why it needs a ‘convergence’ of cultural studies 
(semiotics; anthropology; media analysis) with economics to make sense of what’s going 
on.14 People may invest time, creativity and material resources in creating the right 
signals to attract more attention. They also value paying attention to favoured others. 
Fans, for instance, invest in the attention they offer to their idols. Attention may be 
‘payed’ in many ways, not all of them monetised. Choice may just as easily end in a 
marriage or friendship as a sale. 
Consumers = Producers 
The very concept of a consumer is irrelevant in social networks. Self-organising networks 
of people, who are in it for the value of the relationship with others, are not really 
consuming anything. Quite the reverse. What’s important is not what they buy, but what 
they make and how they signal, whether that’s simply ‘making sense’ of stuff they like, or 
making contact with each other, or making their own creative content, from photos or 
text to competitive gaming strategies or open-source code. The erstwhile ‘consumer’ is 
now the focus and engine of the productivity of the system. 
Social networks are not made of  passive consumers waiting to be persuaded whether to 
buy the blue one or the white one, or push this button rather than that. They are strictly 
peer-to-peer, self-created and sustained, multi-nodal and mutually interconnected 
networks, not the end-point of a linear product pipeline.  
A ballistic strategy, where you ‘target’ this or that consumer profile and then ‘bombard’ 
them with well-aimed messages, that too is wrong-footed.15 
In a social network market you can’t make choices for the consumer. The whole point is 
that users are doing the social networking for themselves. In essence this is a socio-
cultural rather than an economic activity. What people are doing is about their status, 
and those they admire (or otherwise), including their own personal identity-forming 
activities and people in their own private circle.  
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Creative destruction 
From this perspective – the perspective of the DIY user or ‘productive consumer’ – the 
status of organisations is not all that crucial. People interact with content and with others, 
not with firms. Maybe that’s why people don’t think of sharing as piracy – they don’t see 
themselves as being in a proprietary environment. 
It is easy to see that established distinctions between producer and consumer, public and 
private, property and piracy, expert and amateur, agent and institution, are undergoing a 
thorough process of Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction.’ This is ‘remix culture’ with a 
vengeance.16 
In this context it is unwise even to hang on to ‘the firm’ as the obvious unit of agency or 
enterprise, since firms are by no means the only (certainly not the first) source of 
innovation in the online environment. Other forms of association, organisation and 
institution have been established, from self-selecting networks of mutual interest to giant 
enterprises based on attention (Perez Hilton), the gift economy (Gutenberg Project), 
corporate branding (MIT’s free courseware), or friendship (not just Facebook).  
Many of these start out as amateur hobbies (genealogy), which subsequently prove robust 
enough to sustain both commercial and community forms of organisation. In these kinds 
of networks, firms co-exist symbiotically with community networks. Very often the 
‘generative edge’ of a new affordance is not motivated by profit, but unforeseen 
popularity may create a market which firms can stabilise.  
In other words, there’s an evolutionary process where the necessary variation and 
experimentation precedes selection (firms) adoption (markets), and retention or 
extinction (competition). Thus the system as a whole is larger than the market aspect of 
it, and includes more kinds of enterprise than the firm, and more kinds of motivation 
than profit or price incentives.  
So here’s another peculiar thing. If, as government departments and industry analysts 
tend to do, you focus exclusively on the producer end of an industry, then you’re likely to 
miss the creative industries altogether. They cannot be deciphered by looking at what 
firms do; only by looking at what people do, especially when they are interacting within 
very large scale open complex systems.  
But at the same time it’s no good reducing ‘people’ to the status of an atomised and 
individualist ‘self-contained globule of desire’ (in Thorstein Veblen’s immortal words).17 
Individual identity is itself a social project, produced in and by the systems, institutions, 
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networks and relationships in which they participate, all the way up from family and oral 
language to mass mediated celebrity.  
When you consider the ‘identity’ of global celebrities – let’s say Paris Hilton – it is clear 
that this identity is a constantly produced work in progress, and that Ms Hilton is more 
like a global brand or firm than an individual. Of course, as a winner in the economy of 
attention she has amassed myriad more networked connections than ‘ordinary’ 
consumers, which means that in Barabasi’s terms she’s a ‘hub’ rather than a ‘node.’ 18 She’s 
a spike and you’re part of the ‘long tail’ on a ‘power law’ curve of attention connections in 
a ‘scale free network.’ Or, to put it another way, everyone is part of this interconnected 
network. Thus, despite individual difference between Paris Hilton and those who live 
‘the simple life,’ the identity of all is a product of connections in the same dynamic 
system.19 
To proceed on a business-as-usual business plan, where the script says that if firms target 
consumers then industry prospers, prematurely closes down the transformational 
potential of the times. 
Instead of this, and precisely because we seem to have entered a topsy-turvy world where 
it is no longer clear what anything means, we need to take a good hard look at how open 
complex systems work, and what the role of creativity – not to mention industry – may 
be in that context. 
Given the history of unforeseen consequences and an out-of-all-proportion growth of 
knowledge resulting from the adoption of a new communications technology like 
printing, what might be the consequences of interactive computer-based communications 
and the concomitant spread of digital literacy?  
It still is too soon to tell, but it is obvious that we ought not to be thinking about the 
instrumental purposes of the opening players. 
History 
I mentioned at the start that the idea of the creative industries did not emerge from a 
definition but from a situation; and therefore as an artefact this idea is not scientific but 
historical. Indeed, a longer history than the past decade needs to be acknowledged, going 
back to the invention of printing, the Enlightenment – and thence to Classical 
antecedents.  
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Printing with moveable type was initially used (from the 1450s) for ecclesiastical and 
state purposes. Inadvertently, however, by the seventeenth century it had enabled the 
society-wide adoption of realism  through three great textual systems, all of which 
required printed books and periodicals. These were: science, journalism and the novel.  
Print-enabled knowledge grew to intellectual maturity during the seventeenth century. 
The political pay-off came with Enlightenment: knowledge was power; power was 
literate. 
Thereafter, the public function of creative and cultural practices is constantly reinvented 
for each new era, so that the stage on which the ‘creative industries’ eventually debuted 
was already crowded with dramatis personae: 
 From the Enlightenment notion of liberal arts and civic humanism (the public virtue 
of the gentleman), comes the idea of the creative arts as noble, civilising, uplifting, 
aristocratic, ‘noblesse oblige.’ 
 From the nineteenth-century rise of the nation state came the idea of national culture 
and public arts, when European aristocrats turned their pictures over to national 
galleries and their palaces into museums. 
 From industrial culture, especially in America, came the idea of popular arts – fiction, 
cinema, media – based in the marketplace not the public institution, giving rise to the 
citizen-consumer as an amalgam of democratic values (freedom, public) and capitalist 
ones (comfort, private) – Walt Whitman and Wal-Mart. 
 From modernism and the artistic avant-garde came the idea that creativity equals ‘the 
new’ and that anything produced at mass scale is a mere reproduction; thereby 
recasting aristocratic elitism into intellectual elitism, where the newest idea rules.  
  From the Frankfurt School and anti-capitalist leftist academics came the idea of the 
culture industries, where media and state power were coterminous and the state was 
controlled by capital; creative ‘industries’ were but a capitalist mouthpiece; culture is 
commodified. 
 Regional policy depoliticised the idea of the cultural industries and sought to attract 
them to set up in this or that country or city, resulting eventually in the idea of 
‘cultural capitals’ and ‘media capitals.’ 
 From the information industry came the idea of creativity as part of the ‘weightless,’ 
new, or knowledge economy, adding high-value creative content to information 
infrastructure and  connectivity, making creative ‘inputs’ part of value-added services 
or intangibles. 
All of these traditions were in place – and some of them in contention with each other – 
when Chris Smith had his good idea that the creative industries were an emergent 
economic sector. Now the question became: what kind of economic sector was it? 
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Evolution 
Not surprisingly in such a fast-moving and turbulent context, the very idea of what 
constitutes the creative industries is equally dynamic. The concept has shown three 
distinct phases over its short life. Each phase designates a different field of creative 
practice, each wider than and encompassing the one before.20  
The phases are: 
(i) Creative clusters (industry) – closed expert system 
The first phase is the industry definition (DCMS), which I call ‘creative clusters.’ It is 
made of clusters of different ‘industries’ – advertising, architecture, publishing, software, 
performing arts, media production, art, design, fashion etc. – that together produce 
creative works or outputs. This is a ‘provider-led’ or supply-based definition. The sector is 
reckoned to be anywhere between three and eight percent of advanced economies, and 
claimed to be high-growth, with an economic multiplier effect.  
(ii) Creative services (economy) – hybrid system 
The second phase is the services definition, which I call ‘creative services.’ It is 
characterised by the provision of creative inputs by creative occupations and companies, 
most obviously where professional designers, producers, performers and writers add value 
to firms or agencies engaged in other activities, from mining or manufacturing to health, 
government and other public services.21 By one estimate, creative services expand the 
creative industries by at least a third.22 Again, the input is high value-add, indeed, it is 
thought to add value to the economy as a whole, boosting the profitability of otherwise 
static sectors.  
(iii) Creative citizens (culture) – open innovation network 
The third phase is the cultural definition, which I call ‘creative citizens.’ Here is where 
creativity spills out of the economy, being an attribute of the population at large – the 
workforce, consumers, users, and entrepreneurs, who become hard to distinguish from 
artists in how they go about pursuing an idea and creative reputation and a market for it. 
This is a user-led or demand-side definition. The expansion of the creative industries to 
cover everyone (at least in principle) allows the possibility that the energies of everyone 
in the system can be harnessed, adding the value of entire social networks and the 
individual agency of whole populations to the growth of knowledge.  
Such a vastly expanded definition of creative agency is only ‘thinkable’ with 
complexity/network theory and the notion of open complex systems. It is most easily 
evident in computer-based social networks, but is not confined to the digital domain. 
13 
 
Creative citizens are ‘navigators’ rather than ‘consumers’; they may also act in concert as 
‘aggregators’ to produce ‘crowd-sourced’ solutions to creative problems.  
Following this line of thought it is easy to see that there’s more to creativity than what is 
taught in art schools – or business schools. Creativity is generalised as a population-wide 
attribute, it requires social networks, and its ‘product’ is the growth of knowledge, 
sometimes within a market environment, sometimes not.  
This is a radically democratic move, although it is far from universally adopted and its 
implications have barely begun to be worked through. But it is possible to identify the 
new value propositions associated with an evolved and expanded notion of population-
wide creative industriousness in this formula: 
Agents (both professional and amateur)  
+ Network (both social and digital)  
+ Enterprise (both market-based and other forms of purposeful association)  
 = Creative value (in a complex open system) 
 = Growth of Knowledge. 
It may even be argued that the ‘creative industries’ are the empirical form taken by 
innovation in advanced knowledge-based economies. This would place creative 
innovation on a par with other enabling social technologies like the law, science, and 
markets. The creative industries may be regarded as the social technology of distributed 
innovation in the era of knowledge-based complex systems.23 
The evolutionary approach to the economy argues equally for an evolutionary approach 
to culture in general. Modelling not just the economy but also culture as evolutionary, 
and seeing creativity as part of the general process of innovation and adaptation to 
change, has led us towards a new kind of intellectual enterprise that goes under the 
heading of ‘cultural science.’   
Throwing BRICKS 
But just before we get to that, it is worth bringing geography back into the picture. If the 
creative industries can be seen in terms of ‘social network markets,’ then any industry has 
to go through a ‘creative industries’ phase at some point, because the creative industries 
‘involve the creation and maintenance of social networks and the generation of value 
through production and consumption of network-valorized choices in these networks.’24  
Thus there is a development aspect to creative industries thinking, because if adaptation 
to change, access to technologically enabled digital networks, and the production and 
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consumption of network-valorised choices among a creative population, do constitute the 
creative industries, then developing and emergent economies need them more than 
anyone.  
Furthermore, without being encumbered by industrial-era investment in smoke-stack 
industries and rust-belt regions, emergent countries may aspire to become ‘leapfrog 
economies,’ using the creative industries as a social technology of modernisation, global 
engagement and urban development.25 This stimulates their SME and NGO sectors and 
promotes the development of indigenous micro-business.  
It also helps to develop the most abundant resource available to developing countries, 
creative human capital, especially with their predominantly young populations. For 
young people especially, creative expression is itself an attractant to enterprise. In 
developing countries, a creative economy is also a powerful tool for promoting and 
valorising diversity, of both population and cultural expression, both traditional and 
modern. Thus creative industries are the generative edge of innovation among the billion 
or so young people worldwide who are now moving through their teenage years towards 
full economic productivity. 
That is why it is just as important to consider countries like China as the USA or UK – 
indeed the model of creative industries inherited from the latter may be disastrous for 
emergent economies, based as it is on analogue technologies like painting or the record 
industry.  
Thus whatever model of the creative industries is adopted, it needs to take account of the 
‘creative destruction’ that may imminently be wrought on the global economic and 
cultural scene by developing and emergent economies.  
Copyright conflict 
In a context such as this, it is unwise to carry forward a definition of the creative 
industries that is based on record-label and Hollywood notions of copyright. Militant 
enforcement of owners’ IP rights and anti-networking stratagems like DRM are 
predictable responses by existing investors, but that doesn’t make them good policy for 
new ones. 26 
But at the same time it is obvious that commercial value requires that you have 
something to sell, and if that something is an idea there has to be a way to monetise it. 
Hence there is no escaping the fact that copyright and intellectual property are the point 
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of tension for contemporary cultural, creative and commercial conflicts for the 
foreseeable future.  
Here is where old and emergent enterprises clash, and if the overall ‘growth of 
knowledge’ is the ultimate object of study, then the real and contentious questions of who 
owns that knowledge, how it can be shared, through what media of distribution, 
accessible by whom (and on what terms) – there are few more pressing questions.  
Yet neither economics nor cultural studies have thought as carefully as they should about 
the problem of copyright. It’s not an old-style ‘Left v Right’ struggle between libertarian 
progressives and control-culture reactionaries (though does look like that sometimes). It 
is a problem of how to coordinate and organise innovation, dynamism and change in an 
existing complex system without snuffing out either the system or the change.  
Cultural Science 
And so it is more important than ever to get a clear idea of what’s going on. This is what 
has led us to a work in progress that we’re calling ‘cultural science.’  It is an evolutionary 
approach to both culture and the economy, combining evolutionary economics, cultural 
studies, and complexity or network studies. It seeks to investigate the growth of 
knowledge. It sees cultural and biological systems as co-evolutionary, and sees culture as a 
complex open adaptive system.  
An immediate problem is that the fields closest to the study of creativity, including the 
arts, humanities and some branches of the social sciences, have been among the very 
fields most resistant to ‘taking the evolutionary turn’ in relation to their object of study.  
Furthermore, the traditional ‘two cultures’ distinction between science and the 
humanities, and the lack of numeracy among many of the latter, serve to make empirical 
studies of complex evolving systems hard to attempt.  
There are equally gaping holes in the knowledge, skills and aptitudes of those coming to 
creativity and culture from economics or the sciences. They can do circulation, but 
they’re not so astute about text or meaning.  
On both sides there is a tendency to adopt a ‘heads down’ attitude to concentrate on the 
micro-scale of local and familiar problems, leaving the macro scale of systemic 
coordination, hierarchy, growth and interconnection with other systems out of the 
analytic picture. 
16 
 
Just because the phenomena under observation are both dynamic and multivalent, it is 
therefore necessary to move from single-discipline research to problem-solving research; 
from solo hyper-specialisation to team-based collaboration; and from national silos to 
international research networks. Most importantly, it is necessary to develop a coherent 
conceptual and theoretical framework through which to advance from an observational 
to an analytical approach.  
Since embarking on this adventure, those of us pursuing a cultural science approach have 
become more firmly convinced that this is worth pursuing by finding that – under 
various banners – plenty of others are pursuing it too. There are well-established 
programs of research into cultural and biological co-evolution in anthropology, language, 
neuroscience, economics and even social science.27 More recently, evolutionary studies of 
stories, art, and technology have been published.28 The use of complexity studies and 
game theory to model and analyse social networks (both analogue and digital) is well 
advanced.29 Cultural science is but one strand in this general current, and very much in its 
infancy.  
However it is worth the effort not only to find out how the growth of knowledge works, 
but also for more immediate gains. Those trained in the humanities have found it hard to 
make an impression on public policy-formation or engagement with business, especially 
in relation to innovation. It is hard to persuade policymakers and business strategists to 
take creativity seriously without systematic and numerate evidential data to back up any 
claims.  
Thus, while many agree that it is vital to add the cultural and human sciences to national 
R&D investment, to add creativity to science, technology, engineering, and medicine 
(STEM) as an integral part of the innovation system, and to foster creative ideas as well as 
going for the technical fix, none of this will happen if those who are interested in culture 
and creativity can’t translate their specialist language into terms understandable by those 
who are interested in the growth of both the economy and the knowledge base.30    
In the meantime, opportunities are being wasted, by government, business and cultural 
experts alike, to make better use of our growing understanding of the interfaces between 
cultural and economic values, between ideas and markets, between users and 
technologies, between elite expert systems and consumer populations, and between 
emergent and mature national systems.  
 
And thus I end with the question with which Yuri Lotman began: ‘how can a system 
develop and yet remain true to itself?’31 Cultural science is a search for answers to that 
question. 
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